It is well known that the term “mind” refers to the set of cognitive processes, that is, to consciousness, thinking, intelligence, perception, memory, attention and so on. But does the mind have a material reality? Is it a tangible and concrete entity or space? Or is it an abstract concept that brings together a series of immaterial experiences? In this article we will provide you the information about the Extended mind theory.
Philosophy of mind, along with cognitive science, has offered different theories to answer these questions. In turn, the answers were often framed around the traditional opposition between body and mind. To resolve this opposition, the Extended Mind theory asks whether it is possible to understand the mind beyond the brain and even beyond the individual himself.
In the following text, we will briefly see what the proposals of the Extended Mind hypothesis are, as well as some of its main antecedents.
Theory of mind extended mental processes beyond the brain?
The Extended Mind theory extended its formal development in 1998, from the work of philosopher Susan Hurley , who proposed that mental processes did not necessarily need to be explained as internal processes, as the mind did not exist only within the narrow confines of the skull. In his work “Consciousness in Action”, he criticized the input/output perspective of traditional cognitive theory.
In the same year, philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers published the article “The Extended Mind”, which is considered the founding text of this theory. And a decade later, in 2008, Andy Clark published Supersizing the mind , which ends up introducing the extended mind hypothesis into the philosophy of mind and cognitive science debates.
From computational metaphor to cyborg metaphor
Theories of the extended mind are part of the historical development of philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. In this development , different theories emerged about the functioning of mental states and their consequences in human life. We’ll see briefly what the latter is.
The individualistic model and computing
The more classical tradition of cognitive science took the metaphor of the computer operating system as an explanatory model of the mind. Broadly speaking, he proposes that cognitive processing begins with inputs (sensory inputs) and ends with output (behavioral outputs).
In the same sense, mental states are faithful representations of elements in the world, they are produced before internal manipulations of information and generate a series of inferences. For example, perception would be an individual and accurate reflection of the outside world; and occurs in an internal logical order similar to that of a digital operating system .
In this way, the mind or mental states are an entity that lies within each individual. In fact, it is these states that give us the quality of being a subject (autonomous and independent of the environment and relations with it).
It is a theory that follows the dualistic and individualistic tradition about reasoning and the human being; whose maximum precursor was René Descartes, who doubted everything, less than he thought. So much so that the already famous “I think, therefore I exist” inherited us.
But with the development of science, it has been possible to suggest that the mind is not just an abstraction, but that there is a tangible place inside the human body for storage . This place is the brain, which, under the premises of the computational perspective, would fulfill the functions of a hardware, while it is the material and self-configurable support of mental processes.
mind-brain identity
The above arises in continuous debate with theories of mind-brain identity, which suggest that mental processes are nothing more than physical-chemical activities of the brain .
In this sense, the brain is not just the material support of mental processes, but the mind itself is the result of the activity of this organ; so it can only be understood through the physical laws of nature. Mental processes and subjectivity thus become an epiphenomenon (phenomena secondary to the physical events of the brain).
In this sense , it is a theory of the naturalistic approach and, in addition to a cerebrocentric theory, since everything that would be human would be reduced to action potentials and the physicochemical activity of our neural networks. Among the most representative of these theories is, for example, materialist eliminativism or neurological monism.
Beyond the brain (and the individual)
Given this last point, other explanatory theories or models of the mind emerge. One is the Extended Mind theory, which has tried to localize information processing and other mental states beyond the brain; that is, in the relationships that the person establishes with the environment and its objects.
It is, then, to extend the concept of “mind” beyond the individual. The latter represents an important break with the individualism of more classical cognitive science.
But to achieve this, it was necessary to start by redefining the concept of mind and mental processes, and in this model, the reference model was the functionalist one. In other words, it was necessary to understand mental processes from the effects they cause or as effects caused by different causes.
This paradigm had already permeated computational hypotheses as well. However, for the Extended Mind theory, mental processes are generated not just within the individual, but outside of him. And they are “functional” states, as long as they are defined by a cause-effect relationship with a specific function (a relationship that encompasses a set of material elements, even without life itself).
In other words, mental states are the last link in a long chain of causes that end up having the effect of such processes. And the other links in the chain can be from bodily and sensorimotor skills, to a calculator, a computer, a watch or a cell phone. All this while elements that allow us to generate what we know as intelligence, thought, beliefs and so on.
Consequently, our mind extends beyond the specific limits of the brain and even beyond the general physical limits.
So what is a “subject”?
The above not only changes the way of understanding the “mind”, but also the definition of the “I” (understood as “extended self”), as well as the definition of behavior itself, since it is nothing more than a planned action. rationally It is learning that is the result of practices in the material environment . As a result, the “individual” is a “subject/agent”.
For this reason, this theory is considered by many to be radical and active determinism. It is no longer about the environment that shapes the mind, but that the environment is part of the mind itself: “cognitive states have a broad location and are not limited by the narrow border of the human body” (Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005) .
It is likely that the subject is constantly modified by its continuous contact with other material elements . But just having a first contact (for example, with a technological device) is not enough to consider it an extension of the mind and the subject. To be able to think in this way, it is essential that conditions such as automatism and accessibility exist.
To exemplify this, Clark and Chalmers (cited by Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005) give an example of a subject who has Alzheimer‘s. To compensate for memory losses, the subject writes down everything that seems important in a notebook; to the point where, automatically, it is customary to review this tool in the interaction and resolution of everyday problems.
The notebook serves as a storage device for your beliefs as well as a material extension of your memory. The notebook then plays an active role in that person’s cognition and together they establish a cognitive system.
The latter opens up a new question: does the extension of the mind have limits? According to its authors, mental activity occurs in constant negotiation with these limits. However, the Extended Mind theory has been questioned precisely because it does not offer concrete answers to this.
Likewise, the Extended Mind theory has been rejected by more brain-centered perspectives, of which philosophers of mind Robert Rupert and Jerry Fodor are important exponents. In this sense, he was also questioned for not delving into the field of subjective experiences and for focusing on a vision strongly focused on achieving goals.
Are we all cyborgs?
It seems that the Extended Mind theory is about to propose that humans are and act like a hybrid species similar to the cyborg figure. The latter understood as the fusion between a living organism and a machine , and whose objective is to improve, or in some cases replace, organic functions.
In fact, the term “cyborg” is an Anglicism meaning “cybernetic organism”. But the Extended Mind theory is not the only one that has allowed us to reflect on this matter. Indeed, a few years before the founding works, in 1983 feminist philosopher Donna Haraway published an essay called the Cyborg Manifesto .
In general terms, through this metaphor, it was intended to question the problems of Western traditions strongly based on an “antagonistic dualism”, with visible effects on scelialism, colonialism and patriarchy (issues that are present in some traditions of feminism itself) )
Thus, we could say that the cyborg metaphor opens up the possibility of thinking about a hybrid subject beyond mind-body dualisms . The difference between one and the other is that the Extended Mind proposal is part of a tradition closer to logical positivism, with a very specific conceptual rigor; while Haraway’s proposal follows the line of critical theory, with a determining sociopolitical component (Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005).
